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PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR PUBLIC WRONGS
UNDER SECTION 5
Evan H. Caminker*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has ushered in the new millennium with a
renewed emphasis on federalism-based limits to Congress's regulatory authority in general, and Congress's Section 5 power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment in particular. In a recent string of cases,
the Court has refined and narrowed Section 5's enforcement power
in two significant ways.1 First, the Court made clear that Congress
lacks the authority to interpret the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions themselves, and may only "enforce"
2
the judiciary's definition of Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Second, the Court embraced a relatively stringent requirement concerning the relationship between means and ends, ruling that "[t]here
must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."3 Within
the past three years, the Court has applied these standards governing
Congress's Section 5 enforcement to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,4 the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., UCLA,
1983; J.D., Yale, 1986. I am currently on leave as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice.
The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, or United States.
I wish to thank Michael Small, Adam Cox, and the participants in Loyola Law
School's Symposium on Federalism for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
2. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
3. Id. at 519-20.
4. See id.
1351

HeinOnline -- 33 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1351 1999-2000

1352

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 33:1351

6
Clarification Act,5 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
And just last month, the Court applied these same standards to invalidate the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morri-

son.7

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) challenge uniquely
raised a novel question concerning the type of remediation Congress
may deploy pursuant to Section 5. In all previous cases, Congress
enacted enforcement measures that directly regulated the conduct of
states through their officials, either by preventing or remedying conduct that was itself unconstitutional (as defined by the Court), or by
preventing or remedying a somewhat broader category of state conduct as a prophylactic measure to protect against unconstitutional
action. 8 In contrast, VAWA proscribes certain kinds of private conduct rather than state action. While the "wrong" being targeted remains state misconduct purportedly violating the Equal Protection
Clause, Congress's remedy is directed at private behavior.
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,9 the Fourth Circuit invalidated the civil rights Vrovision of
VAWA as lying beyond Congress's Section 5 authority. 0 The court
declared that, in addition to other limitations, Section 5 authorizes
Congress to regulate only state conduct (what I shall call "public remediation"). The court viewed congressional regulation of private
5. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
6. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
7. Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422 (May 15, 2000).
8. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement
power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to
the States."' (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976))); see
also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (recognizing Congress's power under Section 5 to adopt "prophylactic rules").
9. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison,
Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422 (May 15, 2000).
10. VAWA embraced several different enforcement strategies, including
the criminalization of certain behavior, new federal grant programs to assist
states' enforcement efforts against gender-based violence, and a new federal
civil remedy. This Essay deals exclusively with the latter-the so-called civil
rights provision. Further references to VAWA refer, more specifically, to this
civil rights provision. See id. at 827.
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behavior as invalid, not simply because it is "inappropriate" as applied in this particular context due to pretext or means-ends tailoring
concerns (although the court thought this as well), but more broadly
because "private remediation" is a per se inappropriate means of
Section 5 enforcement." In Morrison, the Supreme Court affirmed
this broader ruling, holding that Congress may not invoke Section 5
authority to regulate private behavior even as a means to remedying
state misconduct.12
I want to use VAWA as a lens through which to explore and
take issue with this broader proclamation. Neither text, precedent,
nor federalism values guiding constitutional interpretation persuasively support limiting Congress's Section 5 powers in this manner.
It may well be that a particularprivate remediation scheme (including VAWA) fails the other aspects of the Court's means-ends scrutiny as deployed to address a particular Section 1 problem. However, the constitutionality of Section 5 enforcement does not hinge
on a public/private distinction concerning the regulatory target.
II. VAWA AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF PRIVATE REMEDIATION
The premise of VAWA's Section 5 justification is that, in both
direct and subtle ways, "bias and discrimination in the [state] criminal justice system often deprive[] victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws."'13 Congress found
that states routinely treat violent gender-motivated crimes-crimes
disproportionately affecting women, such as rape and domestic
abuse-less seriously than other violent crimes. Moreover, Congress
determined this disparity of treatment to be attributable to improper
or archaic stereotypes about such violence and its victims reflected in
state laws, evidentiary rules, and the attitudes of state police, prosecutors, and judges. 14
As the Court has held in numerous
contexts, state action based on inaccurate gender-based stereotypes

11. See id. at 862-80.
12. See Morrison, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422, at *35-49. The Supreme Court

also held that VAWA's civil rights provision could not be justified as an assertion of Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. See id. at *16-35.
I will not explore any Commerce Clause issues in this Essay.
13. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
14. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
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may violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend5
ment.'
I wish to stipulate in this Symposium essay that Congress's
findings of discriminatory state law enforcement are sufficient to
satisfy the first doctrinal hurdle facing Section 5 measures. Given
the Court's established state action doctrine, it is clear that Congress
cannot predicate Section 5 authority on the premise that either private misconduct or state "inaction" violates the Fourteenth Amendment.1 6 Congress's premise in enacting VAWA was that states are
violating the Constitution through their affirmative discriminatory
conduct, by generally protecting women from private violence less
stringently than they protect men from private violence. 7 Undoubtedly, the Court would find unconstitutional a state statute that
authorized state officials to investigate and prosecute violence
against men, but prohibited them from investigating and prosecuting
violence against women.1 8 The discriminatory state practices identified by Congress in VAWA's legislative record are typically more
subtle than this exemplary hypothetical. For present purposes, I assume that a state's failure to take gender-motivated violence against
women as seriously as private violence against men qualifies as discriminatory state action for the purpose of triggering Congress's
Section 5 authority. For ease of exposition, I will sometimes refer to
the state's "underprotection" of women from gender-motivated violence as a shorthand for this cognizable form of discriminatory state
action.
While this discriminatory state action creates the public wrong
triggering Congress's Section 5 enforcement authority, VAWA does
not uniquely target official state behavior. Rather, VAWA largely
15. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Morrison, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422, at *39 ("Foremost among
these limitations is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment

by its very terms prohibits only state action.").
17. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49. The Supreme Court in Morrison neither endorsed nor rejected this premise. See Morrison, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422,
at *36-37.
18. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to

seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws
in the most literal sense.").
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targets private conduct by granting victims of gender-motivated violence a federal cause of action against their individual perpetrators.
More specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) declares that "[a]ll persons
within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender." 19 Section 13981(c) provides that
A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured,
in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
and such other
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
20
appropriate.
deem
may
court
a
relief as
Section 13981(d) defines a "crime of violence motivated by gender"
that could create such civil liability,21 and § 13981(e) establishes
various procedures governing civil claims.
It might at first appear counterintuitive for Congress to regulate
22
private misconduct as a means of "remedying or preventing"
19. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
20. Id. § 13981(c). Given this provision's definition of person, VAWA
does theoretically encompass some "state action" as well as private misconduct. Certainly, a state official following state policy or using his badge of
authority to commit a gender-motivated violent crime would be liable in his
individual capacity to his victim. In this sense, VAWA does proscribe some
"core" violations of the Equal Protection Clause. However, VAWA's extensive legislative history makes clear that the civil remedy is designed primarily
with private violence in mind. State officials may fail to protect women as
equally as men from private violence, but the record does not dwell on instances of gender-motivated criminal violence perpetrated by state actors
themselves. For shorthand purposes, therefore, I will refer to § 13981 as embracing a "private remediation" scheme in that it primarily targets private acts

of violence.
21. Section 13981(d)(1) states that a crime is "motivated by gender" if it is
committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id. § 13981(d)(1). Section
13981(d)(2) further defines a "crime of violence" as "an act or series of acts
that would constitute a felony against the person," or "a felony against property

if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury" to a person, under federal or state law and that would constitute a "crime of violence" under 18
U.S.C. § 16. Id. § 13981(d)(2).
22. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999).
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unconstitutional state action. Surely a more direct remedy would be
to proscribe or prescribe state action as necessary to ensure the equal
protection of women and men from private violence. On reflection,
however, there are several ways in which VAWA's civil cause of
action can plausibly be understood as preventing or remedying the
underlying constitutional violation.
With respect to prevention, VAWA's regulation of private conduct might reduce the prevalence of unconstitutional state underprotection in two indirect manners. First, such federal regulation might
serve as a vehicle for spurring a gradual shift in social norms concerning the treatment of women in state criminal and civil justice
systems. There is a burgeoning "norms literature" in legal scholarship concerning the ways in which governmental regulations may
lead various actors to internalize new social norms of behavior, and
through such internalization actually change the way people behave. 23 By highlighting the seriousness of gender-motivated violence and placing a clear stamp of disapproval on such activity,
VAWA might instill in state officials both a greater appreciation of
the problem and a greater understanding of the ways in which their
own sex-stereotyped attitudes perpetuate the problem. 24 To be sure,
such social norm-inculcation might be more effective were the state
officials themselves subject to behavioral regulation, but this observation does not deny that private remediation might still spur norm
adjustment in state officials, even if perhaps somewhat indirectly.
Second, VAWA's very enactment drew public and media attention to the widespread problem of gender-based violence, and individual civil suits under VAWA will further highlight specific acts of
23. See generally, e.g., Symposium, SocialNorms, Social Meaning,and the
Economic Analysis ofLaw, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, Law,
Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); see also Adam B. Cox,
Expressivism in Federalism:A New Defense of the AnticommandeeringRule,
33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1309 (2000) (discussing expressive justifications for legal rules).
24. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (explaining that Congress

intended to make clear to all, including state officials, that "attacks motivated
by gender [are] to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by religious,
racial, or political bias"); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990) (stating that
VAWA reflects "a national commitment to condemn crimes motivated by gender in just the same way that we have made a national commitment to condemn crimes motivated by race or religion").
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violence. Such publicity might well encourage citizens to pressure
their state officials to attack the problem more aggressively. Of
course, these officials might be tempted to use VAWA's enactment
as an excuse for ignoring this public pressure. However, the Court's
own insistence that state officials are accountable to their citizenry in
the realm of criminal law policy suggests that these state officials
would likely respond to such constituent pressure, in order to avoid
being viewed as part of the problem rather than its solution.
More directly, while VAWA does not prevent the unconstitutional state action in any immediate sense, to the extent VAWA deters private violence against women, it does prevent the tangible consequences that flow from such unconstitutional state action. Women
are subject to gender-motivated violence by private actors in part because the state fails to deter such violence by evenhandedly investigating and prosecuting it. Thus, while the state's discriminatory underprotection itself inflicts an intangible harm on women by
devaluing their interests in an unconstitutional manner,25 the state's
underprotection also enables or facilitates the infliction of tangible
harm on women in the form of private violence.26 One might say
that a woman's tangible victimization has two "but for" causes, the
private violence and the state enforcement regime that facilitates
such violence through nondeterrence. By directly deterring the private violence-and thereby fulfilling the state's proper roleVAWA prevents the state's unconstitutional behavior from
contributing to a woman's tangible injury.27

25. Cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754-56 (1984) (referring to "stigmatic injury" caused by government's unequal treatment of specific individuals).
26. Cf Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999) (holding that only tangible
harms resulting from unequal treatment, not the intangible harms caused by the
mere fact of such treatment, give rise to an action for damages as opposed to
prospective relief).
27. To be sure, private deterrence does nothing to remedy the intangible or
dignitary injuries caused by the mere fact of unequal treatment by the state.
But no one suggests that prophylactic Section 5 legislation is valid only if it
prevents or remedies every single instance or facet of constitutional injury.
Partial underinclusiveness may be a factor in assessing whether the legislation
satisfies the requisite means-ends test, but it does not doom the legislation from
the outset.
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With respect to remedying the unconstitutional state action,
VAWA provides victims of private violence with monetary compensation for their tangible injuries. To the extent money can ever truly
compensate for physical and psychic injuries, such monetary recoveries constitute remediation in the most traditional sense. To be sure,
the compensation comes from the pockets of private rather than state
wrongdoers. But the source of the recovery makes no difference to
the recovery's proper characterization as a remedy for the injury
caused by the combination of private violence and state underprotection. Surely if Congress provided monetary compensation from the
federal treasury to victims of unconstitutional state police brutality,
this compensation would be viewed as a legitimate Section 5 "remedy"--in addition to a legitimate exercise of Congress's spending
power-even though the compensation came from federal rather than
state coffers.28
In several respects, therefore, VAWA can plausibly be viewed
as both preventing future and remedying prior injuries caused by the
conjunction of state and private conduct. One might, and the Fourth
Circuit did, quibble with whether VAWA's scheme is sufficiently
tailored to serve these preventative and remedial interests so as to
satisfy the somewhat stringent "congruence and proportionality"
means-ends test devised in Boerne. But I want to put aside this inquiry here and focus on the Supreme Court's and Fourth Circuit's
broader determination that private remediation is a per se inappropriate means of Section 5 enforcement, no matter how severe the record
of state violations and how well-tailored the scheme to prevent and
remedy state wrongdoing.

28. Of course, monetary damages awards drawn from state coffers would
both directly remedy the injuries caused in part by state action, and indirectly
prevent such injuries by deterring future state underprotection. In comparison,
damages awards drawn from private, or federal, coffers would directly remedy
injuries but not simultaneously indirectly deter future state underprotection.
Nevertheless, if the Court's repeated references to "preventing and remedying"
state violations are presumed not to be internally redundant, then remediation
alone through compensation ought to qualify as a legitimate Section 5 measure.
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THE LEGITIMACY OF PRIVATE REMEDIATION

Private remediation for unconstitutional state action is consistent
with the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and principles
of federalism that appropriately guide Section 5's interpretation.
A. Text
Several commentators have suggested that the language and
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions limit Congress
to enforcement measures that directly regulate state conduct. The
claim is that, because Section 5 merely authorizes Congress to "enforce" Section 1, and Section 1 merely proscribes certain state conduct, Congress's Section 5 power is limited to directly proscribing
state conduct. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Brzonkala: "[T]he
plain-language and common-sense understanding [is] that Section 1
provides rights only against the States and that, correspondingly,
Section 5 only grants Congress power to enforce the rights provided
in Section 1 through legislation directed 29against state action, not a
power to regulate purely private conduct."
If one respects the conceptual distinction between means and
ends, however, the conclusion does not "correspondingly" follow
from the premise. To begin with, Section 5's language does not limit
Congress's potential regulatory targets. Section 5 adds to the panoply of congressional powers by providing a new legitimate "end" or
goal of regulation, specifically, to "enforce" the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including Section l's restrictions on state
action. But Section 5 then authorizes Congress to use any "appropriate" means to further this end. 30 It does not, by way of contrast, declare that Congress may only "regulate states to enforce the provisions of this article."
So the argument for limits really rests on a structural claim
about the relationship between Sections 5 and 1. Perhaps when one
thinks of enforcing a restriction, one most naturally thinks of ensuring that the restriction is not violated by the actor whom the

29. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,
865 (4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and
99-29, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422 (May 15, 2000).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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restriction purports to bind. Under this reading, Congress may "enforce" Section 1 only by preventing or deterring Section 1 violations,
which means preventing or deterring state action.
Of course, to the extent that VAWA indirectly-through norminculcation or the instigation of political pressure-deters Section 1
violations or prevents such violations from causing constitutionally
cognizable injuries,3 ' then it qualifies as a means of "enforcement"
even in this most limited sense. In any event, the Court has rejected
such a cramped construction of "enforce" by affirming repeatedly
that Congress may prevent or remedy unconstitutional state behavior. 32 If the Court's repetitive reference to "remedy" separate from
"prevent" is not entirely redundant-a conclusion not to be drawn
lightly-then some measures that redress but do not prevent unconstitutional state conduct must "enforce" Section 1 provisions, undermining the claim that prevention is the sine qua non of "enforce[ment]."
A hypothetical might help to illustrate this point. Suppose a
state enacts a law defining physical assault against white persons but
not against black persons to constitute a crime, in obvious violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. 33 Congress could unquestionably enact a statute pursuant to Section 5 mandating that the state apply its
assault laws in a race-neutral manner; Congress might even be able
to mandate that the state extend its assault laws to include black victims. 34 Suppose instead Congress directly criminalizes assault
against black persons in that state, regulating private conduct. Even
leaving aside any argument that such direct regulation would indirectly spur state legislative reform, 35 it would clearly protect blacks
from suffering tangible constitutional injury caused by the state's

31. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
32. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524-27 (1997); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199,
2206-07 (1999).
33. This hypothetical was offered by Professor Larry Alexander at a Federalist Society conference during which I presented the views contained herein,
and it was later offered by Justice Kennedy at oral argument.
34. See infra note 61 (noting that it is an open question whether Congress
may commandeer state officials to implement federal policy pursuant to Section 5).
35. See supranotes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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unequal provision of protection (although it would not mitigate the
intangible injury caused by the unequal treatment itself). I would
call this a form of prevention; 36 but it certainly qualifies as "enforce[ment]" under the Court's more capacious "prevent or remedy"
construction of that term. Neither the language nor structure of the
Fourteenth Amendment's textual provisions, therefore, preclude private remediation measures per se.
B. Precedent
In Morrison, the Supreme Court relied strictly on its application
of prior precedent in concluding that Congress may not enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment through private remediation schemes. The
Court recounted prior decisions establishing that, because the Fourteenth Amendment targets only state action, Section
5 does not
37
authorize Congress to regulate purely private activity.
The petitioners in Morrison argued that these precedents are
distinguishable on the ground that the cases held only that Section 5
does not expand the legitimate ends of congressional authority to encompass the regulation of purely private activity, but that the cases
did not reject the use of private regulation as a means of combating
unconstitutional state conduct. As the Court put it, the petitioners
"argue[d] that, unlike the situation in the Civil Rights Cases, here
there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities,
36. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
37. See United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. Lexis
3422, *38-45 (discussing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
The Court has previously held that Congress may regulate the conduct
of private actors who engage in "active connivance" with state officials. See,
e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1966). Guest might be read
somewhat more broadly, as six Justices suggested that private action might
violate the Fourteenth Amendment in a larger category of circumstances. See
id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black & Fortas, JJ.) ("[Section] 5
empowers the Congress to enact law punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."); id. at
782-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., & Douglas, J.) (same).
But the Morrison Court eschewed such a broad reading of Guest, proclaiming
that it "ha[s] no hesitation in saying that it would take more than the naked
dicta contained in Justice Clark's opinion, when added to Justice Brennan's
opinion, to cast any doubt upon the enduring vitality of The Civil Rights Cases
and Harris." Morrison,2000 U.S. Lexis 3422, at *44.

HeinOnline -- 33 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1361 1999-2000

1362

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1351

whereas
in those cases there was no indication of such state ac38
tion.
After briefly questioning the accuracy of this description, 39 the
Court responded as follows:
[E]ven if that distinction were valid, we do not believe it
would save § 13981's civil remedy. For the remedy is simply not "corrective in its character, adapted to counteract
and redress the operation of such prohibited state laws or
proceedings of state officers." Or, as we have phrased it in
more recent cases, prophylactic legislation under § 5 must
have a "congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." Section 13981 is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might
not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state
actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts
motivated by gender bias.4°
But this rejoinder again conflates the questions of ends and means. It
is one thing to say that Congress cannot invoke Section 5 as authority
for regulating private behavior as an end in itself, based on the
premise that Congress has regulatory authority over such behavior.
It is quite another thing, however, to say that Congress cannot invoke
Section 5 as authority for regulating private behavior as a means of
preventing or redressing unconstitutional state action. The Court
offered no explanation as to why private remediation as a means is

38. Morrison, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422, at *45.
39. Id. at *45-46 (suggesting that concerns about discriminatory state underprotection of victims of private racial discrimination played a role in the enactment of the earlier civil rights statutes). But see, e.g., The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 14 (describing the civil rights statute proscribing private
discrimination in public accommodations as beyond Section 5 authority because it did "not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong commit-

ted by the States"; instead, the statute regulated private conduct "without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities"). See
generally Laurent B. Frautz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1377-81 (1964) (discussing Harrisand The Civil Rights Cases)..
40. Id. at *46-47 (citations omitted).
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categorically off-limits, so long as it survives the Court's "congruence and proportionality" test in other respects. 4 '
Moreover, the Court reaffinned its previous rulings that Section
5 "includes authority to 'prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstitutional ....,,,42 But if Congress may, as a prophylactic matter,
prohibit conduct that is "not itself unconstitutional" because some of
the activity being proscribed is within constitutional boundaries, why
cannot Congress prohibit conduct that is "not itself unconstitutional"
because some of the actors whose activity is beingproscribedare not
state actors? In other words, there are two different ways in which a
Section 5 remedy might encompass some conduct that does not itself
contravene the Fourteenth Amendment: either the conduct (even if
performed by a state actor) is not wrongful in substance, or the conduct (even if wrongful in substance) is not fairly imputed to the state.
The Court in Morrison provided no rationale for permitting prophylactic remedies proscribing conduct that is "not unconstitutional" because it falls into the former category, but rejecting prophylactic
remedies proscribing conduct that is "not unconstitutional" because it

41. As to this inquiry, the Court simply noted that "Section 13981 is also
different from these previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly
throughout the nation," id. at *48, despite the fact that Congress's findings did
not identify discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes "in
all States, or even most States." Id. But see id. at *112 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that Congress's findings identified constitutional violations in at least
21 states). Taken at face value, this argument implies that Congress cannot enact generally applicable legislation under Section 5 absent a finding that at
least "most States" have engaged in unconstitutional conduct. Id. at *48. This
certainly appears to be a significantly more stringent means-ends test than the
one routinely applied under the Necessary and Proper Clause, thus underscoring the concerns I raise infra concerning the propriety of the stricter "congruence and proportionality" test for Section 5 legislation in the first place. See
discussion infra Part IV.
42. Morrison, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422, at *35 (citation omitted). Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly upheld Section 5 schemes that prophylactically regulate
or proscribe state actions that concededly do not violate Section 1, on the
ground that such regulations are nevertheless appropriate means conducive to
the end of preventing or remedying other state actions that do violate Section
1. See supra note 8; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 644
(2000) ("[C]ongress's power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not
itself forbidden by the Amendment's text.").
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falls into the latter category. At bottom, then, the Supreme Court's
rejection of VAWA's civil cause of action rests on an unexplained
categorical exclusion of private remediation, no matter how appropriately tailored to the legitimate
end of preventing or remedying
43
unlawful state discrimination.
C. StructuralPrinciplesof Federalism
Since neither text nor precedent foreclose resort to private remediation as an "[in]appropriate" means, the issue ultimately turns on
the set of federalism values driving the constitutional boundaries on
congressional authority. While the Supreme Court in Morrison did
not address this consideration, the Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala concluded that private remediation actually poses a greater threat to federalism values than does public remediation, and this distinction justifies a per se exclusion of the former.4 4 In my view, this conclusion
represents a perversion, not application, of federalism principles as
reflected in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
To clarify the analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between two
categories of federalism values. One category ("jurisdictional values") concerns the allocation of lawmaking authority among the federal and state governments; these values protect the states' proper
sphere of exclusive regulatory jurisdiction. The second category
("sovereignty values") concerns the federal-state intergovernmental
relations; these values protect the states' status and dignity as a
43. The Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute &
State University, 169 F.3d 820, 874 (4th Cir. 1999), thought it significant that
prophylactically regulated state conduct might in certain circumstances actually violate Section 1, but prophylactically regulated private conduct could
never actually violate Section 1. But the court offered no persuasive reason
why this distinction should matter. Once Congress is permitted to go beyond
the prevention of "actual" violations, nothing in the language or logic of the
Supreme Court's precedents addressing prophylactic regulation offers a basis
for a bright-line rule limiting such prophylaxis to public remedies. It may well
be that, precisely because purely private regulations never directly prevent behavior that is technically unconstitutional while public regulations might
sometimes prevent behavior that is technically unconstitutional, the former
might less frequently satisfy the contextual means-ends "congruence and proportionality" test. But this conclusion depends on the success of the private
remediation scheme in indirectly deterring or remedying Section 1 violations,
and does not justify a per se exclusion of such schemes.
44. See id. at 876.
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co-equal and original sovereign. The first set of values proves indifferent between public and private remediation and the second set
actually prefers the former to the latter.
1. Section 5 enforcement, jurisdictional values, and the allocation of
lawmaking authority
The Court and commentators have identified a coterie of structural values served by dividing lawmaking jurisdiction between the
federal and state governments, a division secured by respecting the
Constitution's delegation of limited powers to the former. Circumscription of congressional power is frequently defended as serving
one or more of the following values:
(1) enhancing the responsiveness of government to the specific
needs and desires of members of a heterogeneous society,
through (a) decentralizing decisionmaking so as to allow greater
tailoring to local interests, (b) creating smaller government units
so as to bring government officials closer to the people, and (c)
generating competition for a mobile citizenry;
(2) enhancing national social welfare by permitting and encouraging
states to act as laboratories experimenting with diverse solutions
to economic and social problems and generating useful information for the nation as a whole;
(3) stimulating the development of democratic skills and attitudes
by providing more accessible fora for citizen participation in
self-governance; and
(4) sustaining a set of competing institutions with the incentive, as
well as political and economic capital, to identify and oppose the
assertion and especially overreaching of Congress's regulatory
authority and thus reduce the risk of federal tyranny.45
45. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[A federalist
regime] assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."); see also id. ("[T]he
principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of governmental
power."). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47
FLA. L. REv. 499, 524-33 (1995) (evaluating traditionally-stated values of federalism); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
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I call these "jurisdictional values" because they all support a narrow
view of the scope of congressional authority.
The Fourth Circuit asserted in Brzonkala that these values relating to the scope of congressional lawmaking authority are threatened more by private than by public remediation. The court explained as follows:
In fact, if anything, it may well be federal regulation ofprivate conduct pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment [rather
than regulation of state conduct] that poses the greater danger to the sovereignty of the several States. The Fourteenth
Amendment recognizes the sovereignty of the States to
protect their citizens' rights of life, liberty, property, and
equality. A federal power under Section 5 to legislate
against private interference for the protection of these rights
would permit Congress to regulate all of "the rights which
and thereby eliminate
one citizen has ... against another,"
46
whatsoever.
States
the
for
role
any
This last quoted sentence is clearly hyperbole. At the very most,
Congress can regulate private conduct only where that is an appropriate means of preventing or remedying unconstitutional state behavior, which is a far cry from plenary congressional authority.
The more central point, however, is that the potential preemptive
scope of private remediation is no greater than the potential preemptive scope of conventional public remediation. It is true that congressional regulation of private conduct can, and often does, trump
state law and thereby displace the state's erstwhile regulatory role.
But congressional regulation of state conduct does much the same
thing.
Let me illustrate by supposing that, instead of enacting VAWA,
Congress directly enjoined states from either enforcing any law that
provides differential protection to victims based on their sex, or enforcing any facially neutral law in a discriminatory manner. Suppose
further that Congress enforced these prohibitions by authorizing both
NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (discussing such values, and

arguing that all but category (4) are better understood as values of decentralization rather than federalism per se).
46. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 876 (emphasis and ellipses in original) (citations
omitted).
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the executive branch and all aggrieved persons to bring damages actions against the states and their officials, or maybe even by criminalizing certain actions of state officials. These clearly permissible
regulations would trump all contrary state policies, including those
by which the states heretofore purported to protect "their citizens'
rights of life, liberty, property, and equality." 47 The state would either have to impose or enforce stricter regulations on private perpetrators of gender-based violence (which would have exactly the same
preemptive effect as VAWA), or lift or stop enforcing its regulations
on other private perpetrators (which would preempt different state
policies, but to an equally great extent), or employ some combination
of both until its laws and enforcement policies provided for equal
protection of men and women.
These permissible Section 5 regulations would have the same
impact on the jurisdictional values described above as does congressional regulation of private conduct. For example, the diversity and
experimentation among various state policies would be equally circumscribed through either means. Thus, the ultimate scope of congressional interference with the states' police powers does not turn
on whether the states' citizens are governed directly by private remediation schemes or governed indirectly by state compliance with
public remediation schemes.
2. Section 5 enforcement, sovereignty values, and
intergovernmental relations
Much of the Supreme Court's recent federalism case law concerns intergovernmental relations rather than the relative scope of
each government's lawmaking authority. In a series of cases, the
Court has emphasized that "the Constitution established a system of
'dual sovereignty, ' ' 48 and that the states thus retain "a substantial
portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity
and essential attributes inhering in that status., 4 9 This status entails
that "Congress must accord States the esteem due to them as joint
participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of
47. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
49. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999); see also id. (providing
that states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty").
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sovereignty in both the central Government and the separate
States."5
The Court has drawn upon these principles to impose significant
absolute barriers to direct congressional regulation of
sometimes
and
states. The modem Court evinced concern for regulating "States as
States" as early as National League of Cities v. Usery51 and, while
that case was overruled in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,52 the Garcia dissenters made clear their intention to
continue protecting states where possible.53 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,54
the Court imposed a clear statement rule of statutory interpretation as
an indirect means of protecting states from direct federal regulation.
In New York v. United States55 and Printz v. United States,56 the
Court held that Congress may not commandeer state officials to enact or administer federal regulatory programs. 57 Finally, even when
Congress may regulate state activities pursuant to its Article I powers, the states' sovereign status precludes Congress from abrogating
their immunity from unconsented private suits in federal or state
court. 58 Thus, at least when interpreting the scope of Congress's Article I authority, the Court has invoked the states' sovereign status to
discourage or preclude direct congressional regulation of state conduct.
Without question, any public remediation scheme designed to
serve the same ends as VAWA's civil rights provision would similarly constitute highly intrusive regulation in "areas of traditional
50. Id. at 2268.
51. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
52. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

53. See id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
55. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
56. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
57. See id. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
58. See, e.g., Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268
(1997) (recognizing "the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity [from private suit] is designed to protect"); Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2263
("The principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional design 'thus
accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation."')
(quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
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state concem." 59 As suggested earlier, Congress could enjoin state
officials from either enforcing any law that provides differential
protection to victims of violence based on their sex or enforcing any
facially neutral law in a discriminatory manner. Congress could enforce these mandates by imposing both civil and criminal liability on
the state and/or its officials. This would require state officials to alter their definition and/or policing of criminal law, as well as override the venerable principle of state prosecutorial discretion. In addition, the imposition of monetary liability "may threaten the
financial integrity of the states," 60 which at a minimum will divert
state funds that might otherwise be used to bolster law enforcement
resources and redress the underprotection problem. Congress could
also authorize private persons to sue state officials for noncompliance, thus inviting federal courts to issue structural injunctions and
engage in ongoing supervision of state law enforcement policy and
practice. Indeed, Congress might even have the authority to commandeer state officials to enforce specific federally-defined law enforcement policies, thus removing any vestige of state discretion in
this area. 6 1 Public remediation
thus entails some intrusive regulation
62
states.
qua
states
of
59. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S.
Lexis 3422, at *33 (May 15, 2000) ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.").
60. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
61. The same "waiver of sovereignty" theory underlying the Court's decisions that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity from private suit in
federal court pursuant to Section 5 but not Article I, see Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (reaffirming Section 5 abrogation while rejecting
Article I abrogation), can be used to support commandeering of state officials
pursuant to Section 5 even though not pursuant to Article I. See Evan H.
Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUp.
CT. REv. 199, 238-42.

62. John Harrison suggested to me that Congress could at least circumvent
whatever underprotective biases might be traced to state judicial processes by
authorizing original or removal jurisdiction in federal courts over cases
brought to enforce existing state laws against gender-based violence. This
scheme would be far less intrusive on state interests. However, the scheme
would not even purport to address nonjudicial sources of state underprotection.
Moreover, Article III's subject matter limitations would allow the scheme to
remove from state judicial purview only those relatively few cases enforcing
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The Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala brusquely dismissed this concem:
The government maintains, second, that in enacting section
13981, Congress might have chosen to regulate private action, rather than the States directly, so as not to offend the
sovereignty of the States. This argument, however, confuses the Fourteenth Amendment with the Commerce
Clause and other similar grants of federal power. The Supreme Court has often held that it violates principles of
state sovereignty for the federal government to impose certain obligations directly upon the States when acting pursuant to the federal power to regulate interstate commerce,
and various other federal powers. However, the Court has
made clear that, by its very nature, the Fourteenth Amend63
ment is a limitation on the governments of the States.
But, the Fourth Circuit's extension of this case law to a different issue is misguided. While this reasoning does justify Congress's
broader authority to regulate states qua states under Section 5 rather
than Article I, it does not support a preference for public Section 5
remediation over private Section 5 remediation.
To begin with, read for its greatest impact, this line of reasoning-that states waived some of their erstwhile sovereignty interests
in coordinate status (as well as regulatory scope)-suggests that
Section 5 public remediation poses absolutely no threat whatsoever
to the status/dignitary values underlying recent federalism decisions.
But, of course, private remediation by definition also poses absolutely no threat to these values. The most one can say is that these
values are entirely indifferent to Congress's choice between public
state criminal or civil laws that have a sufficient "federal ingredient" to qualify
as "arising under" federal law.
63. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 876 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
453 (1976) (reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment "quite clearly contemplates limitations on [the States'] authority" and "[t]he substantive provisions
are by express terms directed at the States"); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1879) ("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action,
however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.")
(additional citations omitted)), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, Nos.
99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. Lexis 3422 (May 15, 2000).
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and private remediation schemes, in which case they provide absolutely no support for concluding that the latter are per se inappropriate.
In my view, however, the Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala overread
the aforementioned case law concerning the interplay between state
sovereignty and Section 5 authority. Saying, as the Supreme Court
has, that Section 5 gives Congress unique authority to regulate states
qua states in certain ways is not tantamount to saying that such
regulation raises no federalism concerns at all; it is just that a different balance is struck between those concerns and competing concems for federal supremacy in the Reconstruction Amendments than
in the original Constitution. 64 The Court's solicitude for state sovereignty concerns even regarding Section 5 enforcement remains visible in its insistence that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity only by enacting a statute which makes its intent to do so
"unmistakably clear"--an especially difficult legislative barrier to
hurdle.65 And those who would resist congressional commandeering
of state legislative and executive officials pursuant to Section 5
surely view state sovereignty as continuing to have significant force.
Finally, the Court's demand that Section 5 regulations satisfy a
means-ends test of "congruence and proportionality," a test more
strict than Article I's "necessary and proper" standard in both locution and operation, might reflect the recognition that the former but
not the latter test generally governs regulations imposed on state qua
states rather than private entities and/or states as market participants. 66
Thus, it is one thing for the Court to acknowledge that the rights
and status inhering in state sovereignty uniquely give way to certain
federal interests under the Reconstruction Amendments. However, it
is a far different thing to assert, as the Fourth Circuit did in
Brzonkala, that the concept of state sovereignty loses all significance
in this context. More specifically, it seems quite jarring for a court
64. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268 ("The principle of sovereign immunity as reflected in our jurisprudence strikes the proper balance between the
supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.").
65. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 634 (2000).
66. See infra Part IV (suggesting the Court has yet to provide a satisfactory
explanation for the heightened means-ends scrutiny applied to Section 5 measures).
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ostensibly concerned about following the Supreme Court's recent
lead in protecting the interests of federalism to proclaim that state
sovereignty counts for absolutely zero when67comparing the propriety
of public and private Section 5 remediation.
But even if this proposition is correct, at most it suggests that
public remediation is not uniquely disfavored along this dimension.
It offers no reason to view private remediation as comparatively disfavored, let alone reason to view private remediation as per se inappropriate. Thus, neither the federalism values underlying recent case
law regarding the scope of federal authority nor those regarding the
sovereign status of states can persuasively justify the exclusion of
private remedies from Congress's Section 5 arsenal.
IV. PRIVATE REMEDIATION AND MEANS-ENDS TAILORING
If one fully embraces the Supreme Court's recent sovereigntyprotecting doctrine and rhetoric, then forcing Congress to choose
public rather than private remediation under Section 5 by ruling the
latter simply off limits seems quite perverse. Even if one resists the
import of this doctrine and rhetoric, federalism values certainly provide no reason to prefer congressional regulation of states qua states
over congressional regulation of private conduct. And the constitutional text seems capacious enough to permit any means, public or
private, designed to enforce Section 1 restrictions on state behavior.
So long as a particular private remedy is a "congruent and proportional" response to unconstitutional state conduct, it appropriately
lies within Congress's Section 5 arsenal.
Of course, by its very nature private remediation "prevents or
remedies" unconstitutional state conduct in a somewhat less direct
manner than would the regulation of state behavior, and thus might
have a more difficult time passing the "congruence and

67. I,among many others, have criticized the Supreme Court's recent paean
to "state sovereignty" and protection of special "status" and "dignity" interests-as distinct from its more defensible efforts to circumscribe the scope of
congressional regulatory authority-as excessively formalistic. See, e.g.,
Caminker, supra note 61. But it is particularly discordant for a court that
seems to applaud this recent case law, let alone is bound to adhere to it faithfully, to dismiss so blithely any regard for state sovereign status in the face of
Section 5 regulation of states qua states.
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proportionality" test. And the tighter the means-ends nexus the
Court demands under this test, the fewer private remedial schemes
will survive.
This Essay's focus on private remedies thus naturally raises the
question why the Court employs a stricter means-ends test for assessing Section 5 measures than the looser "necessary and proper"
test governing Congress's exercise of its Article I powers. I think the
Court's stricter "congruence and proportionality" test lacks solid
constitutional grounding. Certainly Section 5's requirement of "appropriate" legislation does not dictate uniquely heightened scrutiny;
both the text of Section 5 and its drafting and legislative history
strongly suggest that the Framers intended to incorporate the same
means-ends test that Chief Justice Marshall articulated when construing the Necessary and Proper Clause and implied Article I powers in McCulloch v. Maryland.68 Boerne and its progeny explain that
the test of "congruence and proportionality" is designed to ensure
that Congress does not end up "substantively" redefining (compared
to the Court's definition) the meaning of Section l's restrictions on
state action: "Lacking such a connection [of congruence and proportionality], legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect." 69 But this same concern can be voiced for Article I regulation. If Congress purports to stretch its regulatory authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause "too far" through an attenuated
means-ends nexus, it similarly threatens to redefine "substantively"
68. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). See, e.g.,
Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the FourteenthAmendment:
City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109
YALE L.J. 115, 131-33, 141-45 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, 1l

HARv. L. REv. 153, 178 & n.178 (1997).
While the Court has-in the Article I context-held that certain means
of regulating states are off limits, e.g., commandeering state officials and
authorizing private suits for damages, it has never retreated from McCulloch's
deferential standard for evaluating the relationship between permissible means
and legitimate ends.
69. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
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the scope of its legitimate Article I ends (compared to the Court's
definition). Further inquiry into the propriety of the more stringent
"congruence and proportionality" test that might constrain many private remediation schemes is thus clearly warranted, though it must
await another day.
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